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Abstract 
In recent years, a large body of research has demonstrated that judgments and behaviors 
can propagate from person to person. Phenomena as diverse as political mobilization, health 
practices, altruism, and emotional states exhibit similar dynamics of social contagion. The 
precise mechanisms of judgment propagation are not well understood, however, because it 
is difficult to control for confounding factors such as homophily or dynamic network 
structures. We introduce a novel experimental design that renders possible the stringent 
study of judgment propagation. In this design, experimental chains of individuals can revise 
their initial judgment in a visual perception task after observing a predecessor’s judgment. 
The positioning of a very good performer at the top of a chain created a performance gap, 
which triggered waves of judgment propagation down the chain. We evaluated the dynamics 
of judgment propagation experimentally. Despite strong social influence within pairs of 
individuals, the reach of judgment propagation across a chain rarely exceeded a social 
distance of three to four degrees of separation. Furthermore, computer simulations showed 
that the speed of judgment propagation decayed exponentially with the social distance from 
the source. We show that information distortion and the overweighting of other people’s 
errors are two individual-level mechanisms hindering judgment propagation at the scale of 
the chain. Our results contribute to the understanding of social contagion processes, and our 
experimental method offers numerous new opportunities to study judgment propagation in 
the laboratory.  
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Significance statement 
Individual judgments, feelings, and behaviors can spread from person to person in social 
networks, similarly to the propagation of infectious diseases. Despite major implications for 
many social phenomena, the underlying social contagion processes are poorly understood. 
We examined how participants’ perceptual judgments spread from one person to another 
and across diffusion chains. We gauged the speed, reach, and scale of social contagion. 
Judgment propagation tended to slow down with increasing social distance from the source. 
Crucially, it vanished beyond a social horizon of three to four people. These results advance 
the understanding of some of the mechanisms underlying social contagion phenomena as 
well as their scope across domains as diverse as political mobilization, health practices, and 
emotions.  
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Introduction 
Social influence extends beyond people’s direct contacts. In recent years, a large body of 
research has demonstrated that judgments, feelings, and behaviors can “spread” from 
person to person in social networks, similarly to the propagation of infectious diseases. 
Social contagion phenomena have been observed across a wide range of domains, such as 
public health (1–3), altruism and cooperation (4), risk perception (5), violence (6), political 
mobilization (7), and emotional states (8). Social contagion has been modeled in laboratory 
experiments (9) and described in field studies on subjects ranging from hunter–gatherer 
villages in Tanzania (10) to Facebook users (7, 8) and online recommendation networks 
(11). Behavioral contagion also serves adaptive functions in the collective behavior of animal 
swarms (12). 
Unlike the propagation of diseases or the diffusion of information, the propagation of 
judgments often requires more than a single interaction between a sender and a receiver. 
Rather, the receiver needs to be “won over” by the sender’s judgment before adopting and 
eventually spreading it further (13). Various social factors that reduce the receiver’s 
uncertainty about the quality of the sender’s judgment can thus facilitate judgment 
propagation (14). For instance, being exposed to the same judgment from different sources 
increases the probability of its adoption (13, 15, 16). Likewise, the sender’s reputation 
shapes the strength of social influence (17), with reputation being treated as a proxy for 
judgment quality. Another factor is the history of past interactions between the sender and 
the receiver. Specifically, being able to repeatedly observe the good performance of a 
sender can reduce the receiver’s uncertainty about the quality of the sender’s judgment and 
consequently enhance the sender’s social influence (18).  
In a collective context, the repeated transmission of a judgment from person to person can 
give rise to global patterns of social contagion that can be described in terms of properties 
such as reach, speed, and intensity. In the context of innovation diffusion and viral 
marketing, simple mechanisms of influence can produce adoption cascades, in which the 
adoption of a product propagates across a large part of the population (11, 16, 19, 20). This 
form of social contagion, however, is restricted to environments in which people choose from 
a finite set of options and in which their choice is public and thus evident to all their 
neighbors. The spread of a judgment arises from a different and arguably more complex 
process, not least because judgments are often continuous and multidimensional. In 
addition, people might be only partially influenced by others’ judgments (5). In fact, global 
cascades of judgment propagation are rarely observed. According to the three-degrees-of-
influence hypothesis, judgment propagation is inherently limited to a social distance of about 
three people (21). That is, a person’s influence on the judgment of neighboring individuals 
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gradually dissipates with social distance and eventually ceases to have impact beyond three 
degrees of separation (1, 2, 4, 7). Several behavioral mechanisms have been proposed to 
explain this “wall”, including the progressive deterioration of the judgment due to information 
distortion during social transmissions, and the fact that the social ties connecting people may 
not be robust across time, meaning that propagation pathways are interrupted (21). In 
addition, the nature of the transmission method—active teaching or simple copying, for 
instance—can foster or hinder propagation efficacy, as has been demonstrated in the 
domain of human cultural evolution (22, 23).  
From the above literature, it appears that three main conditions should suffice for the 
emergence of long-distance judgment propagation: (i) The originator of the judgment 
consistently provides accurate judgments, so that observers have little uncertainty about the 
quality of his or her subsequent judgments; (ii) all individuals can accurately observe others’ 
judgments and their quality, meaning that transmission noise is minimal; and (iii) the 
connections between people are stable, so that propagation pathways are uninterrupted. 
Under these conditions, an observer B should eventually be prompted to adopt the judgment 
of an initiator A, who repeatedly makes accurate judgments. In the absence of information 
distortion, B should in turn start performing well. This should subsequently prompt a third 
individual C to adopt B’s—and thus indirectly A’s—judgment. If the same process is 
repeated across many adjacent individuals in a chain, then the judgment of A could, in 
principle, propagate from person to person over long social distances. However, any 
systematic distortion of A’s initial judgment over social transmission would make that 
judgment less accurate—and thus less persuasive. The increasingly distorted judgment 
would eventually cease to propagate. In this article, we examine whether the above three 
conditions are sufficient for the emergence of long-distance judgment propagation—and, if 
not, which other factors impede judgment propagation over long distances.  
To this end, we present two studies. In Study 1, we investigated—using a simple visual 
perception task—the conditions under which the judgment of an individual A can spread to 
another individual B, as B repeatedly observes the judgment and performance of A. The 
conventional experimental paradigm in the advice-taking literature consists of observing one-
shot interactions between two strangers—the participants neither know nor repeatedly 
interact with one another (14, 24). In contrast, we investigated how repeated interactions 
shape the strength of social influence, as has been done in work on “reputation formation” 
[see, e.g., (25, 26)]. In Study 2, we evaluated the collective dynamics of judgment 
propagation. We created unidirectional chains of six participants in which all individuals 
repeatedly interacted with their predecessor. That is, individual A initiated the chain, B 
repeatedly interacted with A, C repeatedly interacted with B, and so on up to individual F. 
Initially, all individuals were strangers. In each interaction round, they made an initial 
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judgment, observed the judgment of their predecessor, potentially revised their judgment, 
and forwarded their final judgment to the next person in the chain. We then examined how 
far, under these favorable circumstances, A’s judgment would travel down the chain. The 
results of Study 1 indicate that the influence of A on B increased gradually as the two got to 
know each other. However, as expected, this happened only if A performed considerably 
better than B. Study 2 showed that whenever individual A (i.e., the originator of the chain) 
consistently rendered more accurate judgments than the rest of the chain members, waves 
of judgment propagation were triggered down the chain: Round after round, A’s judgments 
traveled increasingly farther. Crucially, however, the influence of A vanished beyond a social 
distance of about three people. That is, A influenced individuals B, C, and D, but not E and 
F. By modeling the experimental results and running numerical simulations, we then show 
that the participants’ tendency to overweight their predecessor’s error, combined with 
information distortion, generates exponentially increasing delays in propagation. This, in 
turn, resulted in the gradual extinction of influence with social distance.  
Results 
Experimental design. We designed a visual perception task modeled on random-dot 
kinematograms (27). In each round, participants observed a set of 50 dots moving on a 
computer screen. Some dots moved consistently in a similar direction (“correlated dots”) and 
others in random directions. Participants were asked to determine the main direction of the 
correlated dots as accurately as possible (see details in Materials and Methods, Fig. 1, and 
Video S1). The correct answer was a specific angle 𝜃 (i.e., a continuous value between 0° 
and 360°). Individuals were paired with the same partner for 15 consecutive rounds (see Fig. 
2). In each round, individuals indicated their estimated angle by moving an arrow, then 
observed their partner’s estimate, and finally either revised the first estimate or discounted 
the advice by pressing a button. We influenced the performance level by implementing three 
difficulty levels (i.e., adjusting the proportion of correlated dots; Fig. 1): low (level 1); medium 
(level 2); and high (level 3). In every round, the correct answer 𝜃 was always identical for 
both members of the pair, but the difficulty level could differ between them. For instance, one 
member of a pair might experience a low difficulty level (level 1) and the other a high 
difficulty level (level 3). In this example, the first individual would estimate the same true 
angle 𝜃 more accurately than the second. The difficulty level that each member of the pair 
experienced remained constant across the 15 rounds. Participants were not informed about 
the difficulty level they or their partner were facing. However, they could learn about their 
respective levels of performance by comparing their own and their partner’s responses with 
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the correct angle, which was displayed on screen at the end of each round. Consequently, 
participants could learn how accurate and thus how valuable their partner’s judgment was.  
Individual behaviors. In Study 1, we paired an individual facing a task of difficulty level i 
with a partner facing a task of difficulty level j for 15 consecutive rounds. In each round, we 
measured the partner’s influence on the individual’s judgments. We tested six conditions by 
varying i in {2,3} and j in {1,2,3}. Each Si-Pj condition (subject facing a difficulty level i paired 
with a partner facing a difficulty level j) was repeated with 100 participants.  
First, we measured the deviation ∆!!= |𝑥!! − 𝑥!!| and ∆!!= |𝑥!! − 𝑥!!| between the individual’s 
and the partner’s estimate at round r, before and after social influence occurred. Here, 𝑥!! 
corresponds to the individual’s initial estimate at round 𝑟; 𝑥!! to the individual’s final estimate 
at round 𝑟 (after possibly revising the estimate); and 𝑥!! to the partner’s estimate at round 𝑟. 
For notational simplicity, we drop the superscript r when not referring to the number of a 
specific round. Fig. 3A shows the values of 𝛥! and 𝛥! at rounds 1 and 15 for all 100 
participants in condition S2-P1 (i.e., an individual facing a medium difficulty level paired with 
a partner facing a low difficulty level). In round 1, individuals tended to ignore the advice of 
their partner (i.e., ∆!!≈ ∆!!), but by round 15 they were strongly influenced by it (i.e., ∆!!"≈ 0,∀∆!!"). We defined and studied three possible revision strategies (see the color 
coding in Fig. 3A): ignore (i.e., 𝛥! = 𝛥!), adopt (i.e., 𝛥! is smaller than a small threshold 
value 𝑑!), and compromise (i.e., 𝛥! < 𝛥! and 𝛥! ≤ 𝑑!). We set the value of 𝑑! to 20°, which 
corresponded approximately to the length of the mouse pointer on the screen and thus 
tolerated minor inaccuracies in drawing an arrow. All data points for which 𝛥! was lower than 𝑑! cannot support any conclusion and were thus not taken into account in this classification 
(but were included in all other analyses). Fig. 3B shows the observed proportion of 
participants adopting each strategy across the 15 rounds in all six conditions. When paired 
with a partner experiencing a low difficulty level (S2-P1 and S3-P1), individuals switched 
rapidly from ignore to adopt within the first few rounds of interactions. This suggests that the 
initial strategy of disregarding a stranger’s estimates was swiftly abandoned as an 
individual’s uncertainty about the quality of the partner’s performance diminished. The 
partner’s influence increased faster for individuals facing tasks of high difficulty level 3 than 
for those facing a medium difficulty level 2 (see the comparison of the S3-P1 and S2-P1 
adoption curves in Fig. S1). This suggests that individuals were sensitive to the difference 
between their own performance and their partner’s performance, rather than just to their 
partner’s absolute performance. Furthermore, individuals seemed to overweight their 
partner’s error relative to their own (24, 25). For example, in condition S3-P2, individuals did 
not systematically adopt their partner’s judgment, even though their partner performed better 
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than they did. In this condition, the partner experienced a medium difficulty level 2 and thus 
often made substantial estimation errors. This impaired the individual’s ability to detect that 
the partner’s performance was better than their own. Similarly, individuals in condition S3-P3 
almost consistently ignored their partner’s judgment, despite equal performance levels.  
Model. Next, we modeled the above results using a computational model inspired by 
accounts of social reinforcement learning (28). The purpose was to establish a link between 
the mechanisms of influence within dyads observed in study 1 and the dynamics of judgment 
propagation that will be shown in study 2. For the model, we assumed that individuals 
assessed the performance or “quality” 𝑄! of their partner at the end of each round r. Initially, 
in the absence of any information about their partner’s performance, quality was set to the 
neutral value 𝑄! = 0. At the end of each round r, individuals updated their perception of their 
partner based on the outcome of that round, as follows: 𝑄! = 𝑄!!! +  [ 𝑒!!  −  𝜔 ⋅ 𝑒!], 
where 𝑒!! = |𝑥!! − 𝜃!| is the error of the initial estimate made by the individual at round r, and 𝑒! = |𝑥! − 𝜃!| is the error made by the partner at round r. The partner’s performance was 
therefore evaluated relative to the individual’s own performance, as the results of study 1 
suggested. The parameter 𝜔 is the error-overweighting coefficient, representing the weight 
that individuals assigned to their partner’s errors. The model sets 𝜔 = 1 if individuals 
weighted their own and their partner’s errors equally, 𝜔 > 1 if individuals overweighted their 
partner’s errors relative to their own, and 𝜔 < 1 if individuals underweighted their partner’s 
errors relative to their own. Over time, individuals repeatedly updated the value of 𝑄! and 
could form a positive (𝑄! > 0) or negative (𝑄! < 0) perception of their partner’s quality, 
depending on the temporal sequence of relative errors experienced. After individuals 
observed their partner’s judgment 𝑥! at round r, the current value of 𝑄! determined which 
revision strategy they would select. The model stipulates two threshold values 𝜏! and 𝜏!: It 
assumes that individuals ignore their partner’s judgment if 𝑄! < 𝜏!; adopt it if 𝑄! > 𝜏!; and 
compromise if 𝜏! ≤ 𝑄! ≤ 𝜏!. The final judgment is therefore 𝑥!! = 𝑥!! if individuals ignore the 
advice; 𝑥!! = (𝑥!! + 𝑥!)/2 if they compromise; and 𝑥!! = 𝑥! + 𝛿 if they adopt the advice. The 
value of 𝛿 accounts for the imperfection of the adoption strategy (as evident in Fig. 3A). We 
defined |𝛿| as a random value chosen in the interval [0 𝑑!], where  𝑑!=20˚ (as in the strategy 
classification analysis); the sign of 𝛿 is negative if 𝑥!! < 𝑥! and positive if 𝑥!! > 𝑥!. We 
determined the model parameters 𝜏!, 𝜏!, and 𝜔 by simultaneously fitting the model to the 
aggregate behavioral curves of all six conditions shown in Fig. 3B. The best fitting 
parameter values, minimizing the squared deviation from empirical data, were 𝜏! = 15°, 𝜏! = 55°, and 𝜔 = 2.0. The fitted value of 𝜔 = 2.0 is higher than 1, indicating a considerable 
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overweighting of the partner’s errors. The calibrated model predicts performance levels that 
are in good agreement with the data (Figs. S2, S3, and S4). For comparison, the same 
fitting procedure fixing 𝜔 = 1 (i.e., assigning equal weight to the individual’s and the partner’s 
errors) failed to fully reproduce the observed performance levels (see Figs. S3 and S4). 
Judgment propagation. In Study 2, we examined the dynamics of judgment propagation in 
chains involving six people, A, B, C, D, E, and F (see Fig. 2B). Each person in the chain was 
paired with their predecessor in the chain for 15 consecutive rounds. That is, in each round, 
the individual at position k observed the final estimate of the individual at position k ‒ 1 
before entering her or his final estimate. This estimate, in turn, served as the advice given to 
the individual at position k + 1. The originator (individual A) had no partner and was thus 
never subject to social influence. A always experienced a low difficulty level 1, whereas all 
subsequent individuals always experienced a high difficulty level 3. At round 1, all individuals 
in the chain were strangers. However, we expected B to soon notice A’s good level of 
performance and to adopt A’s judgments. Consequently, we expected C to notice B’s good 
level of performance and to indirectly adopt A’s estimates. Round after round, we expected 
A’s judgments to propagate increasingly further down the chain, with F eventually performing 
as well as A.  
We collected data for 20 independent chains, each composed of six unique participants. In 
each round, we measured the influence of individual A on all subsequent individuals (B to F). 
Social influence s was measured as  𝑠 = 1 − (𝑒! − 𝐸!!)/(𝐸!! −  𝐸!!), 
where 𝑒! = |𝑥! − 𝜃| is the observed error of the participant; the baseline error 𝐸!!  is the 
average error of all participants facing a task of difficulty level 1 before any interaction 
occurs. The social influence s thus measures the degree to which participants facing a high 
difficulty level 3 can minimize their error to that of the baseline error 𝐸!! displayed by 
individual A (who faces a low difficulty level 1), scaled by 𝐸!! − 𝐸!!. The values of s for all 
rounds and social distances, averaged across all 20 chains, are shown in Fig. 4. Waves of 
judgment propagation are clearly visible, indicating that propagation occurred. The judgment 
of A spread to B after two rounds, to C after four rounds, and even to D after about eight 
rounds. However, individuals E and F were rarely influenced by the judgment of A within the 
time horizon of the experiment (i.e., 15 rounds).  
To better understand the mechanisms underlying this propagation pattern, we conducted 
simulations of the same experimental setup using our model (calibrated with the fitted 
parameter values from Study 1). We first evaluated the impact of each component of the 
model separately (Fig. 5A). As compared to a simple contagion model, the inclusion of 
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information distortion curtailed the range of propagation to about 10 degrees of separation. 
This is obviously insufficient to explain the much shorter propagation ranges observed. 
However, combining information distortion with the overweighting of the partner’s errors 
drastically limited the propagation range to around three to four degrees of separation, 
consistent with our data (see the analytical calculations in the supplementary information).  
Finally, we used the model to explore the dynamics that take place over an extended time 
horizon. Fig. 5B shows the social influence of originator A over 100 rounds of interactions. 
The propagation range initially increased with the number of rounds but eventually plateaued 
at a social distance of approximately three degrees of separation for strong influence (s > 
0.7) and four degrees of separation for moderate influence (s > 0.4). At five degrees of 
separation, social influence was no longer visible. We then calculated the time required until 
the originator’s influence traveled different social distances. As Fig. 5C shows, the time 
required increased exponentially with social distance. That is, the time needed to reach the 
next individual in the chain was almost three times longer than the time needed to reach the 
previous one. The contagion wave thus slowed down with social distance, and traveling 
further than four individuals from the source thus required an excessively large number of 
rounds (see the propagation speed curves in Fig. S5). An analytical exploration of the model 
(presented in the supplementary information) revealed that each component of the model 
changed the functional form of the propagation delays. In the absence of information 
distortion and error overweighting, propagation time increased linearly with social distance. 
However, the inclusion of information distortion resulted in a polynomial increase in 
propagation times, and the addition of error overweighting resulted in the propagation time 
growing exponentially, consistent with our observations (Figs. S6 and S7). Both of these 
factors impacted the functional form of the propagation delays.   
Discussion 
Social contagion phenomena are difficult to study because they root in two intertwined layers 
of complexity, namely, that (1) induced by the network structure, and that (2) induced by the 
behavioral processes that operate within the network. In this article, we disentangled both 
layers and examined, in detail, the behavioral processes that drive judgment propagation for 
a simple network structure, namely, a transmission chain. Our experimental design enabled 
us to trigger waves of judgment propagation down the chain and study the behavioral factors 
influencing propagation. 
For the time window of 15 interactions and a linear, unidirectional network structure 
examined here, we found that judgments rarely propagated beyond a distance of about three 
individuals. Our numerical and analytical results suggest that judgments could propagate 
farther but the time necessary to do so increases exponentially with social distance. 
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Propagation over distances greater than three to four individuals would require (1) a 
consistently more accurate originator, (2) an error-free observation of others’ performance, 
and (3) a static chain structure to be maintained during several hundred of interactions.  
Our results reveal some of the factors impeding spatial propagation beyond this range. First, 
judgments become progressively more distorted over successive social transmissions. Such 
distortion may even occur when individuals are able to accurately observe others’ judgment 
and performance. In our behavioral data, distortion stemmed from imprecisions in imitating 
the partner’s judgment or from slight deliberate alterations to the partner’s judgment. 
Consequently, judgments tend to become gradually less accurate—and therefore less 
influential—as they travel further from their source. The second factor that impairs long-
range propagation is the overweighting of other people’s errors [also called “egocentric 
discounting” (25)]. This effect has previously been described for pairs in the advice-taking 
and reputation-formation literature (25); we have shown that it is also key to judgment 
propagation or lack thereof. In a pair, overweighting the partner’s errors slows down the 
adoption of judgments because each error committed needs to be compensated for by 
several good performances. In a chain, the delay is amplified at each further position: The 
perceived quality of individual B in the eyes of individual C decreases as long as B performs 
poorly and thus as long as B has not yet adopted the judgment of A. For each subsequent 
step down the chain, the same process repeats with longer time delays. Overweighting other 
people’s errors therefore contributes to the observed exponential growth of the time delays. 
 
These results raise a number of interesting issues. Most importantly, future research should 
investigate how these behavioral dynamics may change in more complex network topologies 
(29). It is conceivable that multiple simultaneous sources of influence, as rendered possible 
in a more complex network, convey different judgments and may operate as sources of 
“noise”. If so, such noise, in turn, is likely to impair propagation. Yet, clustered networks with 
redundant ties could also expose individuals to a converging judgment originating from 
different pathways and thus provide social reinforcement for its adoption (15). Our novel 
experimental design is versatile. It could be adapted to examine how judgments propagate 
through more complex network topologies and the extent to which presently observed 
limitedness of judgment propagation generalizes.  
When combined with recent techniques assessing the structure of a social network (30), our 
approach could offer an experimental microworld that eventually can help to predict where 
and when the results of a promotion campaign will be most visible. Clusters of people 
separated by fewer than three individuals are likely to respond similarly to social 
interventions, giving rise to the clustering of judgments within regions of social networks (19). 
Additional simulations that we conducted show that good performers engender 
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longer influence pathways (see Fig. S8). This “human factor” — that is, the initiator’s 
past performance — influences the dynamics in addition to other structural factors related to 
the target’s surrounding network structure, such as the node’s degree or centrality 
(e.g. (15)). In sum, the complex interplay between human factors and the structure of the 
social network is key to better understand the dynamics of judgment propagation.  
Materials and Methods 
Experimental design. The experimental task was to estimate the direction (i.e., angle) in 
which 50 dots, displayed in a circular area, moved on a computer screen (Fig. 1). The task 
was developed using HTML/Javascript and SmartFoxServer. A set of 25 unique angles 
equidistantly distributed between 0° and 360° served as true angles. The animation was 
displayed at a rate of 20 frames per second. While the dots were still moving, participants 
indicated their estimate by using the computer mouse to place a black arrow in the circular 
area. Once they had confirmed their first estimate (by pressing a mouse button), the 
movement of the dots was interrupted and a blue arrow indicating the partner’s estimate was 
displayed. Participants could then use the mouse to revise the angle of their black arrow and 
pressed a button to confirm their final estimate. Participants who did not wish to revise their 
estimate could immediately press the confirmation button. Finally, the correct angle was 
displayed as a red arrow. Furthermore, the number of points p scored by the participant in 
that round was displayed. The number of points awarded was an exponentially decreasing 
function of the error 𝑝 = 10𝑒𝑥𝑝(−5𝑒!!) rounded to the closest integer, where 𝑒! is the error 
on the final estimate expressed in radians. Participants could therefore score between 0 and 
10 points in each round. At the end of the experiment, the total number of points was 
converted into monetary bonuses at a rate of €0.005 per point.  
Procedure. Data were collected between November 2015 and January 2016. The 
experimental procedure was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Max Planck Institute 
for Human Development. Fifteen participants were recruited for a preliminary study in which 
we collected the partners’ estimates, and 100 participants were recruited for the main phase 
comprising studies 1 and 2 (58 males, 42 females, Mage = 25.4 years; SD = 3.7). All 
participants gave informed consent. They received a flat fee of €10 for their participation, in 
addition to a monetary bonus depending on performance. In the preliminary phase, we 
collected independent estimates from 15 participants for each of the 25 true angles, and for 
each of the three difficulty levels (see Fig. 1 for the implementation of the difficulty levels). 
Thus, each participant in the preliminary study provided one estimate for each true angle at 
each difficulty level (75 estimates in total). Partners’ estimates in the main experiment (i.e., 
studies 1 and 2) were drawn from this pool of data.  
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In the main experiment, after receiving instructions, participants first completed five 
individual training rounds at each difficulty level. For study 1, they were then paired with a 
partner for 15 consecutive rounds (see Fig. 2A). The partner was chosen randomly among 
the participants in the preliminary study (see above). The 15 true angles and the 
corresponding estimates of the chosen partner were randomly drawn from the data provided 
by that partner during the preliminary phase. In each round, participants first estimated the 
angle, then observed their partner’s estimate, and then indicated their final estimate. 
Subsequently, the correct angle was revealed, the participant’s total score was updated, and 
a new round started. After 15 rounds, participants were informed that they would be paired 
with a new partner and another series of 15 rounds started. This procedure was repeated six 
times, corresponding to the six conditions Si-Pj with i in {2,3} and j in {1,2,3}, where i is the 
difficulty level faced by the participant and j is the difficulty level faced by the partner. As a 
manipulation check, we implemented a seventh condition S1-P3, in which the individual 
faced a low difficulty level and the partner faced a high difficulty level. As expected, 
participants in this condition systematically disregarded their partner’s judgment because 
they could easily provide an accurate answer of their own. The results of this condition are 
not reported in the manuscript. For study 2, each participant participated in another series of 
15 rounds in the chain setup (see Fig. 2B). A new chain was started every five participants 
(i.e., at participant numbers 1, 6, 11, and so on). In 15 consecutive rounds, the first 
participant in each chain (e.g., participant number 1) was paired with a partner (the 
originator) randomly drawn from the participants in the preliminary study. The 15 final 
estimates given by that participant served as the 15 pieces of advice that the next participant 
(participant 2) received. This procedure was repeated until the end of the chain was reached 
(e.g., until participant 5 was paired with participant 4) and a new chain started (e.g., 
participant 6 was paired with a random partner from the preliminary study). In this way, we 
collected a total of 20 independent chains. All participants in the chains experienced the 
highest difficulty level (except for the originator of the chain, who was drawn from the 
preliminary study and experienced a low difficulty level). In total, participants took part in 
eight series of 15 rounds: seven corresponding to the seven Si-Pj conditions in study 1, and 
one corresponding to the chain setup in study 2. The order of the eight conditions was 
randomized, that is, the position of each condition in the experiment was counterbalanced 
across participants. Finally, all participants completed eight additional series of 15 rounds for 
another study, in which they faced two or three partners at the same time. The results of this 
study are not reported in the present paper. The experiment lasted about 60 minutes in total. 
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Figures 
 
Fig. 1. Experimental design. (A) Participants were exposed to visual stimuli consisting of a 
set of 50 moving dots. A proportion pc of correlated dots moved in the direction 𝜃 + 𝜀,, and 
the remaining proportion 1‒pc of uncorrelated dots moved in random directions. Here, 𝜃 was 
the true value that participants had to estimate visually and 𝜀 was a random deviation from 
the true value, sampled from the interval [‒𝜀 𝜀] for each correlated dot (to avoid exactly 
parallel trajectories of the correlated dots, which would have rendered the task too easy). 
The three difficulty levels were characterized by different proportions of correlated dots, pc = 
50%, 30%, and 5%. In addition, the deviation was set to 𝜀 = 0˚ in difficulty level 1 and to 𝜀 = 
45˚ in difficulty levels 2 and 3. The black arrows show the true value 𝜃 in each example and 
were not visible to participants. During the experiment, correlated and uncorrelated dots 
appeared in the same color (light and dark grey are used in this figure for illustration only). 
See Video S1 for animated examples. (B) The distribution of errors made by all 100 
participants at each difficulty level in the absence of social influence (i.e., before any 
interaction occurred). The values of pc and 𝜀 for each difficulty level were calibrated prior to 
the experiment to yield clearly distinguishable error distributions. 
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Fig. 2. Schematic representations of the two experimental setups. In study 1, two 
individuals A and B were paired for 15 consecutive rounds. In each round, they separately 
faced the visual perception task described in Fig. 1. The correct answer 𝜃 was always 
identical for both of them, but the difficulty level could differ between them. The respective 
difficulty levels were fixed across the 15 rounds. In each round, individual B could reconsider 
her or his initial estimate after observing A’s estimate. (B) In study 2, six participants (here 
called individuals A, B, C, D, E, and F) were connected along a chain for 15 consecutive 
rounds. Each individual in the chain was paired with his or her predecessor in the chain. 
Otherwise, the same procedure was followed as in study 1. That is, in each round, the 
estimate of the originator, individual A (in blue), was shown to individual B, who could then 
reconsider her or his initial estimate accordingly. Individual B’s revised estimate was then 
shown to C, who could, in turn, reconsider her or his estimate, and so on until individual F. 
This process of social transmission from A to F was repeated across the 15 rounds. The 
originator A always experienced a low difficulty level 1 and all subsequent participants 
always experienced a high difficulty level 3. 
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Fig. 3. Participant behavior in study 1. (A) Illustration of the behavioral change between 
round 1 (black dots) and round 15 (white dots) for all 100 participants in condition S2-P1 
(individuals, S, facing a medium difficulty level 2 paired with partners, P, facing a low 
difficulty level 1). The three background colors indicate the zones corresponding to the three 
strategies: ignore (red), compromise (yellow), and adopt (blue). Whereas participants mostly 
ignored their partner’s judgment at round 1 (72% of black points in the red zone), they 
tended to adopt it at round 15 (85% of white points in the blue zone). (B) The proportion of 
participants adopting each strategy across the 15 rounds in all experimental conditions. The 
detailed example shown in A corresponds to the first and last rounds in the upper left 
subpanel of B.   
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Fig. 4. Judgment propagation down the chain (study 2). Observed intensity of social 
influence averaged over 20 experimental chains. The color coding indicates the influence of 
the originator’s judgment on the final estimates of all other individuals in the chain, as a 
function of their social distance from the originator (x axis) and the number of the round (y 
axis; see also Fig. 2B). Individuals located one degree of separation from the originator (i.e., 
social distance = 1) rapidly adopted the originator’s judgments (social influence approached 
1 as early as round 2). Individuals located two degrees of separation from the originator 
were influenced by the originator after about 4 rounds of interaction. Participants located at a 
social distance greater than 3 were rarely influenced by the originator.  
(See high quality figure in the final publication) 
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Fig. 5. Dynamic features of judgment propagation in study 2. (A) The intensity and 
range of social contagion after 15 rounds, assuming different propagation mechanisms 
(model previously calibrated in study 1): full and immediate adoption of the partner’s 
judgment (in black), distortion of information only (in blue), distortion of information and error 
overweighting (in red). Circles correspond to experimental data. (B) Intensity and range of 
social contagion over 100 rounds of interactions as predicted by the model. The range of 
social contagion initially increased with time but eventually plateaued at a social distance of 
4. (C) The time delay required for social influence to travel through the chain increased 
exponentially with social distance. The dots indicate the model predictions (for 1,000 
simulation runs), and the lines show the best exponential fit. For distances larger than 4 
persons, the time delay exceeded 100 rounds before a weak influence (s = 0.2, in blue) 
appeared. Strong influence (s = 0.8, in red) could not propagate beyond a social distance of 
3 persons because information distortion rendered the (indirect) adoption of the originator’s 
judgment increasingly impossible. The inset shows the same figure with a logarithmic 
transformation along the y axis, confirming the exponential growth of the time delay.    
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